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Casenote

Georgia v. Randolph: What to do With a Yes
from One but not from Two?
In Georgia v. Randolph,' the United States Supreme Court held that
when an officer asks two physically present occupants of the same
shared residence for permission to search, that search is unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment2 to the United States Constitution when
one occupant denies permission to search, though the other consents.3
In so holding, the Court created a new standard in which "widely held
social expectations" dictate whether it is reasonable to assume an
occupant has the authority to consent to a search.4
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Scott and Janet Randolph just could not get along. On the morning
of July 6, 2001, Janet Randolph called the police and complained that
her husband had taken their son away. When the police arrived on the
scene, she also complained that her husband's cocaine habit was causing
them financial troubles. When Scott Randolph returned shortly

1.
2.
3.
4.

126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1526.
Id. at 1521.
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thereafter, he had a different story. He told the police that he and Janet
had separated a few weeks prior to this incident and that she had taken
their son to Canada for more than a month. He further explained that
he only took their son to a neighbor's house for fear that she would take
him out of the country again. He also denied using cocaine and accused
Janet of drug abuse.5
One of the officers then accompanied Janet Randolph to retrieve the
child, and upon their return, she again complained that her husband
was abusing drugs. However, this time, she mentioned that there was
evidence of drug-use in the house. At this point, the officer asked Scott
Randolph if he could search the house. Scott Randolph plainly refused.
The officer then asked Janet Randolph for permission to search, and she
readily consented.6
Janet Randolph then led the police upstairs, and while searching in
Scott Randolph's bedroom, the officer noticed a section of a drinking
straw with a powdery residue on it. Suspecting the residue was cocaine,
the officer went to his car to get an evidence bag and to call the district
attorney's office. When the officer called, the district attorney said to
stop the search and get a warrant. The officer then returned to the
house, at which time Janet Randolph withdrew her consent to the
search. At that point, the police took both the straw and the Randolphs
to the police station. Later, the police obtained a warrant and returned
to the house where they found further evidence of drug-use. Scott
Randolph was subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine. 7
Randolph moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that in light of his
express refusal, his wife's consent could not authorize the warrantless
search of his house.' The trial court denied the motion, finding that
Janet Randolph had "common authority" to allow the search.9 On
appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme
Court sustained the reversal. 10 The United States Supreme Court
"granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on whether one
occupant may give law enforcement effective consent to search shared
premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and states a refusal to
permit the search."1'

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 1519.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

10. Id.
11. Id. at 1520 (overruling the following courts of appeals decisions that held that
consent of one occupant is effective in the face of an express objection from another: United

States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 533-36 (1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33

2007]

GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH

II.
A.

1431

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Overview

One of the fundamental protections afforded by the United States
Constitution, the Fourth Amendment safeguards "[tihe right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." 2 In interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has determined that as a general rule,
a warrantless search of a person's home carries the presumption of
unreasonableness.13 There are, however, a few "jealously and carefully
drawn" exceptions to this rule.'4 One such exception is that police may
search a suspect's house if they receive voluntary consent from either the
suspect himself 5 or, in his absence, a third-party occupant who has
common authority over the residence. 6 The validity of these thirdparty consents has been the subject of controversy among legal
commentators and lower courts, but it has not been extensively analyzed
by the Supreme Court.'7 Prior to the case at bar, the Supreme Court
had fleshed out only a modest amount of analysis on the subject in a
handful of cases.' 8
B. Early Cases: An Absence of JudicialAnalysis on Third-Party
Consent
Prior to the 1960s, the Supreme Court heard very few cases involving
a third-party's consent to a warrantless search, and in these cases, it
only inferentially broached the subject without much analysis, if any.' 9
For example, in Weeks v. United States,2 ° the Court seemed to imply
that a warrantless search could not be made reasonable by consent from
a neighbor or a boarder. 21 In Weeks the police went to search a defen-

(1992); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (1979) (per curiam); United States v.
Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (1977)).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971)).
14. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
15. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
16. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
17.

3 WAYNE R.

AMENDMENT

18.
19.
20.
21.

LAFAVE,

§ 8.3 (3d ed. 1996).

Id.
Id.
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
See id. at 398.

SEARCH

AND SEZIURE:

A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
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dant's home and were told by a neighbor where the key was. Finding
the key, the police entered, searched the defendant's home, and found
evidence against him. Later that same day, the police returned to
search for more evidence against the defendant and were admitted by a
boarder. In both searches, the police entered without a warrant." The
Court held that the searches violated the Constitution, but in so holding,
the Court did not mention the consent given by the neighbor or the
boarder.2" It seems obvious that neither a neighbor nor a boarder
would have authority to consent to the search of another person's house,
and perhaps that is why the Court did not address these third-party
consents in its analysis. Consequently, it can only be assumed that the
Court determined that neither the neighbor nor the boarder had
authority to consent to the searches.
In Amos v. United States,24 the Court again skirted the issue of
whether and in what circumstances a third party can give valid consent
to a search. 25 In Amos two deputy tax-collectors went to the defendant's house to search for evidence of untaxed whiskey sales. When the
collectors arrived, they met the defendant's wife at the door and told her
they had come to search for evidence. She then opened the door for the
collectors and allowed them to search. Neither of the collectors had a
warrant at the time of the search.26 Holding the search to be invalid
on other grounds, the Court reserved the question of whether the wife7
could consent to a search that would be valid against her husband.1
In fact, the Supreme Court would not examine the issue of third-party
consent with any real scrutiny for another forty years.28
C. The Beginnings of a Third-Party Consent Analysis
The Supreme Court first shed some light on its views of third-party
consent in the 1961 case of Chapman v. United States.29 In Chapman
police responded to a call from a landlord who smelled an "'odor of
mash'" (a smell associated with distilling alcohol) emanating from the
house he was renting to the defendant.3 0 The police and the landlord
knocked on the door and heard no response. Subsequently, at the

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 386.
Id. at 398.
255 U.S. 313 (1921).
Id. at 317.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 317.
LAFAVE, supra note 17, at § 8.3.
365 U.S. 610 (1961).
Id. at 611.
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direction of the landlord, the police entered through an unlocked window
and found evidence of an illegal distillery in the house. The police had
no warrant at the time of the search.3 ' Arguing that the search was
valid, the Government contended that property law granted the landlord
the right to bring police officers and enter the house in order to "'view
waste.' 3' 2 In response, the Court held that the search was unreasonable, stating that "subtle distinctions" in property law should not be the
sole controlling force in Fourth Amendment analysis.33 The landlord,
therefore, could not give a valid consent to search his tenant's home
without some further consent from the tenant himself.14 While "subtle
distinctions" in property law were not dispositive in this case, it seems
the distinction between a landlord-tenant relationship and a co-occupant
relationship determined whether the consent was valid. Essentially, this
holding reveals that property law does not control but may influence
whether or not a third-party validly consented to a search.
35
Three years after Chapman was decided, in Stoner v. California
the
Supreme Court held that consent from a hotel manager was not
sufficient to allow a search of a hotel guest's room.3" In Stoner the
police were searching for the defendant on the suspicion that he had
robbed a food market. Following a lead but without a warrant, they
approached the night clerk of a hotel and asked if Joey L. Stoner was
staying there. The clerk answered yes but said that he was not in at the
time. Then, the police explained to the clerk why they were looking for
Stoner and asked for permission to search his room. The clerk
courteously obliged and unlocked Stoner's door for the police to search.
Upon thoroughly searching the room, they found evidence of the food
market robbery, which was used against Stoner at trial. 37 The Court
determined that this search was unreasonable, holding that the clerk
had no authority to consent to a search of the defendant's room because
the clerk was not an agent that could waive the defendant's constitutional right against warrantless searches for him.3"

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 611-12.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 617 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960)).
Id. at 616-17.
376 U.S. 483 (1964).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 484-86.
Id. at 488-89.
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D. Third-Party Consent Examined Fully
In the 1971 case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire,9 the Supreme Court
briefly examined the validity of a third-party's consent and touched on
policy supporting the conclusion that such consent is valid.4" In
Coolidge the police suspected the defendant of murdering a young girl.
In response to a tip from a neighbor that Coolidge had been out on the
night of the girl's murder, the police visited him at his house. They
questioned him and asked if he owned any guns, and in what appeared
to be a show of complete cooperation, he brought out three guns. The
next day, he went with the police to take a lie detector test, and while
he was there, other police officers visited the Coolidge's household.
When they reached the door, Mrs. Coolidge answered, and they asked
her if her husband owned any guns; they were not the officers who first
interviewed Coolidge, and they did not know that he had previously
4 1 In response to the police's inquiry, she said her
produced three guns.
husband did have some guns and led the officers up to their bedroom
where she showed them four guns and some of his clothes.42 The
clothes and the fourth gun, a 22-caliber Mossberg rifle, were later used
by the prosecution as evidence against the defendant. The defendant
moved to suppress this evidence.43 The Court observed that the crux
of the defendant's argument was that the police should have either (1)
asked Mrs. Coolidge if she had her husband's authorization to give up
the clothes and guns or (2) called Coolidge himself and asked for his
permission to take them." The Court disagreed with this argument
and held that the evidence was admissible.4" Consequently, Mrs.
Coolidge's consent was valid against the defendant. Touching on the
rationale behind this holding, the Court noted that "it is no part of the
policy underlying the Fourth ... [Amendment] to discourage citizens
from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of
criminals."4 '
In the 1974 case of United States v. Matlock,47 the Supreme Court
directly addressed whether a third-party may consent to a search of a

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Id. at 488-90.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 489.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 488.
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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suspect's residence in his absence.48 In Matlock the defendant was
arrested in'the front yard of a residence he shared with a second
occupant, Mrs. Graft. After the police put the defendant in a patrol car,
they knocked on the door of the residence, seeking permission to search
the house. Mrs. Graft, the suspect's co-occupant, answered the door with
a child at her hip and consented to the search. Thereafter, the police
entered and discovered evidence of the suspect's criminal activities.4 9
Despite the defendant's objections, the Court held that consent from
a co-occupant who "possesses common authority over premises or effects"
is sufficient to allow a search when the other occupant is absent.50 The
Court further explained that this "common authority" is influenced by,
but not dependent on, property law rights.5 1 Indeed, a co-occupant
need not have a legal property interest in the residence in order to
exercise authority over it.52 On the contrary, according to the Court,
this authority stems from the occupants' "mutual use," "joint access," or
"control [of the premises] for most purposes. " " The Court further noted
that by sharing control of the premises, such occupants run
the risk that
4
one of them might allow a search of the common area.
Affirming Matlock sixteen years later in Illinois v. Rodriguez," the
Court considered whether a third-party must actually have authority
over a residence in order to consent to its search.56 In Rodriguez the
police responded to a call from Gail Fischer, a woman who claimed that
the defendant had beaten her. She and the defendant had been living
together in the same apartment for several months. Ms. Fischer said
that the defendant was asleep in the apartment, and she consented to
let the police in so they could arrest him. When they entered, they saw
evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view. The police then
arrested the defendant, though they had no warrant. Later, testimony
revealed that Mrs. Fischer had actually moved out weeks prior to the
arrest. Consequently, the defendant moved to suppress the drugevidence on the basis that Ms. Fischer had no authority to consent to a
search of the apartment.57 The Court held that the search was
reasonable and that police need only have a reasonable belief that the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 170-72.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 172 n.7.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 171.

55. 497 U.S. 177, 185, 188 (1990).
56. Id. at 179.
57. Id. at 179-80.
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consenting third party has the authority to consent to a search over the
premises."

III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In Randolph the Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle whether
a warrantless search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when
one co-occupant consents to a police search but another physically
present co-occupant refuses.59 The Court held that in such circumstances, a warrantless search is unreasonable."'
A.

The Majority Opinion
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Souter explained the
Court's reasoning in roughly five stages. First, the majority briefly
recapped applicable rules from relevant co-occupant consent-to-search
cases. 6 Second, from a detailed discussion of United States v. Matlock,62 the majority distilled the "widely shared social expectations"
standard." The Court created this standard to determine whether it
is reasonable to expect an occupant to have the authority to grant an
inspection.64 Third, the majority illustrated the "widely shared social
expectations" standard by applying it to Matlock, a handful of other
cases, and finally the case at bar.65 Fourth, the majority addressed
potential counterarguments and countervailing interests in conflict with
its holding.6 6 Fifth and finally, the majority ended by tying up "two
loose ends" in its reasoning.67
The first stage of the majority opinion began by briefly revisiting
Fourth Amendment consent-to-search case law.
Noting the development of this area of the law through several cases, the majority
recognized that voluntary consent to a search of a resident's home can
make a warrantless search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.6 9

58. Id. at 186.
59. Randolph v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006).
60. Id. at 1519.
61. Id. at 1520.

62. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
63. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1520-21.
64. Id. at 1521.
65. Id. at 1521-23; see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
66. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1523-26.
67. Id. at 1527-28.
68. Id. at 1520.
69. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
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The majority further noted that this consent may come from either the
suspect himself or, when the suspect is absent, a fellow resident who
shares common authority over property.70 Despite this body of law, the
majority observed that the Supreme Court had not yet heard a case
where one co-occupant consented to a search while another physically
present occupant objected. 71 To determine the effect of such a refusal,
the majority turned to the "underpinnings of the co-occupant consent
rule, as recognized since Matlock" to frame its reasoning.72
In the second stage of its opinion, the majority drew from Matlock to
explain the reasoning behind the co-occupant consent rule.7 ' Recalling
the ruling from Matlock, the majority affirmed that a search of a shared
residence is reasonable when a co-occupant with "common authority"
over that shared residence consents, even if the other occupant is
absent.74 The majority further explained that the "common authority"
that allows a co-occupant to consent to the search does not stem from
property rights alone, but rather from "mutual use," "joint access," and
"control for most purposes."75 To clarify, the majority explained that
a co-occupant's "common authority" to allow a search comes from a
common social understanding about the rights an occupant has over a
shared residence. 6 The majority phrased this social understanding in
terms of "widely shared social expectations" and explained that although
these shared social expectations are sometimes reflected in property law,
they are not dependent on it.77 In sum, the court explained that a cooccupant's consent makes a warrantless search reasonable provided that
"widely shared social expectations" indicate that the co-occupant has the
authority to give consent.78
In the third stage of its opinion, the majority illustrated the "widely
shared social expectations" standard.7 9 To demonstrate the viability of
its new standard, the majority applied it to the facts of Matlock and

70. Id.
at 170).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Matlock, 415 U.S.

at 1520-21.
at 1521 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170).
(quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172 & n.7).
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other cases."0 Then, the majority applied the standard to the facts of
the case at bar."1
Starting with Matlock, the majority reasoned that when a person like
Mrs. Graff comes to the door of a residence with a child in tow, it is
reasonable to expect her to be able to allow visitors.8 2 The "widely
shared social expectation" is that if she lives there, she probably has the
common authority to permit visitors like most typical tenant arrangements usually allow."
Moreover, the majority reasoned that if one
tenant is absent, it is commonly understood that the other tenant has
the authority to admit guests whom the absent tenant may not like.84
To further demonstrate this standard, the majority examined the
8
8
outcomes of United States v. Chapman"
and Stoner v. California."
The majority observed that no property right or typical contract
agreement points to a common understanding that landlords and hotel
managers have the authority to allow visitors without the occupant's
consent.8 7
When applying the standard to the case at bar, the majority observed
that no visitor would normally feel comfortable entering a shared
residence when one occupant permits entry while the other objects. 8
Under these circumstances, the majority reasoned, a visitor would not
feel comfortable entering because there is no societally recognized
hierarchy of authority among co-occupants of a shared residence.8 9 In
other words, as the majority explained, there is no common understanding that one co-occupant's invitation prevails over another occupant's
refusal to permit entry.'
In fact, according to the majority, domestic
property law reflects the absence of a recognized hierarchy of authority
because in cotenancy arrangements, each cotenant has the right to enjoy
the property as if he or she is the sole owner.9 Hence, the majority
concluded that no "widely shared social expectation" suggests that one

80.

Id. at 1521-22.

81. Id. at 1522-23.
82. Id. at 1521.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 1521-22.
85. 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
86. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
87. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522.

88. Id. at 1522-23.
89. Id. at 1523.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing 7 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY@

Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender 2005)).

§ 50.03[1] (Michael
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co-occupant generally has the authority to permit visitors to enter when
another occupant objects.92
In the fourth stage of its opinion, the majority addressed some
potentially conflicting interests, including those mentioned by the
dissents.93 First, the majority noted that citizens have an interest in
exposing criminal activities.94 More specifically, the majority observed
that cotenants who share a residence with criminals have a significant
interest in deflecting suspicion from themselves.95
However, the
majority reasoned that the interest in exposing criminal activity does not
require "a theory of consent that ignores an inhabitant's refusal to allow
a warrantless search."96 The majority further reasoned that cotenants
may deflect suspicion from themselves in other ways, such as bringing
evidence of their co-occupant's criminal activities to the police.97
Next, the majority addressed the dissent's contention that this holding
traps the victims of spousal abuse in that spousal abusers can simply
refuse to allow police to enter despite the invitation of the abused
spouse.9" In response, the majority reasoned that "this case has no
bearing on the capacity of the police to protect domestic victims."99 The
majority explained that if a domestic dispute occurred and two occupants
disagreed about letting the police in, there would be no question that the
police could enter the dwelling to protect one of the occupants from the
other.'00 The police would only need to have good reason to believe
such a threat exists. 10 '
However, as the majority explained, the
police's right to enter to protect a victim was not the issue in this
case.'0 2 The issue was whether a search for evidence is reasonable
when one co-occupant consents and the other objects-to which the
10 3
majority's answer was no.
In the fifth and final stage of its opinion, the majority addressed what
it called "two loose ends."'0 4 First, the majority addressed an issue
with language in Matlock that mentioned that a co-inhabitant has "'the

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 1524-26.
Id. at 1524 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)).
Id.

96. Id.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 1525 (referring to Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).

99.

Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1527.
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right to permit [an] inspection in his own right.'"' 5 The majority
noted that Matlock's "right" to permit an inspection left the question of
how one co-occupant's objection to a visitor's entry can eliminate
another's right to permit it.' °6 The majority answered by holding that
this "right" to permit entry is not a property right in the legal sense, but
it is the authority a co-occupant is generally understood to have over the
residence. 0 7 To clarify, the majority explained that asking whether
one occupant may divest another occupant of his right to permit entry
is really a question of whether it is commonly understood that the
consenting co-occupant has the authority to prevail over the objecting cooccupant.' 8o
The second loose end addressed by the majority concerned the
significance of Matlock and Rodriguez after its decision.'O°
The
majority noted that in Matlock and Rodriguez, the defendants did not
have the opportunity to object because they were not physically present,
though they were nearby."' The loose end, according to the majority,
was whether police must seek out other nearby potentially objecting cooccupants in order to perform a reasonable warrantless search when
they already have the consent of one co-occupant."' To resolve this
concern, the majority drew a fine line by holding that a defendant must
be physically present and objecting in order to overcome a co-occupant's
consent to a warrantless search." 2 Further explaining its holding, the
majority determined if the defendant was in another room or asleep on
the couch, then he would be considered absent, and he would miss the
opportunity to object to a search."' Concerned with the police's ability
to actually perform consentual searches, the majority concluded that this
formalism was justified." 4 The majority closed its opinion by reiterating its holding that "a physically present inhabitant's express refusal of
consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the
consent of a fellow occupant.""'

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
U.S. at
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172 n.7).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (referring to Matlock, 415 U.S. at 179 (Douglas J., dissenting); Rodriguez, 497
180).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1528.
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Concurrences

Justices Stevens and Breyer both filed brief concurring opinions.
Justice Stevens noted that the social changes evidenced by this case
illustrate the inadequacy of a strict originalist interpretation of the
Constitution.' 6s An originalist approach, which seeks to ascertain an
original understanding of the Constitution, would be inappropriate under
these circumstances, according to Justice Stevens, because unlike the
social climate at the time of the Fourth Amendment's ratification,
today's society recognizes that men and women have equal authority
over the household." 7 During the era in which the Fourth Amendment was ratified, husbands were masters of the household and their
decision to permit or deny entry was all that mattered."'
Justice
Stevens explained that in today's society, neither man nor woman is
master of the house, and consequently, neither one has authority to
overcome the other's constitutional right to deny a warrantless
search. 1 9
Justice Breyer agreed with the result in this case but expressed
concern about its effect on domestic abuse and also noted with some
concern the fact-specific nature of the majority's holding. 20 Focusing
on the totality of the circumstances, Breyer noted that (1) the search was
solely for evidence, (2) Mr. Randolph was physically present and
unequivocally objecting to the search, and (3) the officers did not express
concerns about possible evidence destruction.'
In light of these
circumstances, Breyer agreed with the court's decision, but if the
circumstances were different, he would not have agreed.'2 2 If the
police were responding to the invitation of a possible abuse victim, then
Breyer would have ruled that the police could reasonably enter despite
the objection of another occupant.12
C.

Dissents

Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas each wrote dissenting opinions.
In his first written dissent since being confirmed to the Court, Justice
Roberts objected to the majority's reasoning on roughly four grounds: (1)

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1529.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1530.
Id.
Id.
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"widely shared social expectations" are too imprecise to form the basis
of an adequate rule; (2) the majority's analysis of social expectations
departs from the Court's traditional analysis of privacy expectations; (3)
the application of this rule is arbitrary and formalistic; and (4) the
majority's holding is in conflict with domestic abuse problems.124
According to Chief Justice Roberts, the "widely shared social expectations" standard is the wrong analytical tool to use when examining
Fourth Amendment reasonableness.' 25 Chief Justice Roberts rejected
the conclusion that a visitor would automatically feel compelled to leave
when co-occupants disagree about allowing him to enter.126 According
to Chief Justice Roberts, the visitor's social expectation is dependent on
a variety of different factors. 127 For example, if the visitor were a
relative, he might have felt comfortable entering despite the cooccupants' disagreement. 1" In another instance, a visitor might have
felt comfortable entering if two of three occupants consented, while the
third occupant objected. 1 29 Thus, social expectations shift with each
different factual scenario, and Chief Justice Roberts accordingly
reasoned that such expectations "are not a promising foundation on
which to ground a constitutional rule." 30
Chief Justice Roberts further noted that the majority was mistaken in
its conclusion that "widely shared social expectations" were the common
thread in deciding questions of consent in prior consent-to-search
cases.13 ' To the contrary, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that before
this case, the Court only examined Fourth Amendment reasonableness
in terms of the individual's subjective expectation of privacy.3i 2 He
further pointed out that traditionally, the Court only analyzed social
expectations to determine (1) whether a search occurred at all and (2) if
an occupant had standing to object to a search. 33 According to Chief
Justice Roberts's assessment of prior case law, if a person's subjective
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, then police could not
He further
search without a warrant or that person's consent.'
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explained that an individual's expectation of absolute privacy is not
reasonable when the individual shares information, papers, or places
with another person because the individual assumes the risk that the
other person will share access to those things." 5 As an example, Chief
Justice Roberts reasoned that if two friends shared a locker and one of
them kept contraband inside, the other friend might have expected his
locker-mate to keep it a secret, but such an expectation would not be
reasonable because his privacy had "'already been frustrated'" by
sharing the locker-space."' 6 Chief Justice Roberts also determined that
the same analysis applied to shared living-space." 7 As an example,
he explained that contrary to the majority's analysis, the search in
Matlock was reasonable because the defendant assumed the risk that
Mrs. Graff might allow a search of their shared residence.3 8'
Chief Justice Roberts also criticized the majority's holding for its
arbitrary application and admitted formalism.3 9 He concluded that
it was arbitrary because under this rule, an objecting occupant is only
protected from a search if the objecting occupant happens to be at the
door when the police ask for consent. 40 Otherwise, if the occupant
was asleep on the couch or a room away when the co-occupant answered
the door and gave consent, then the occupant has no protection from a
warrantless search.14 ' Consequently, Chief Justice Roberts contended
that the majority's formalistic holding really only protects the occupant's
42
good fortune of being at the door when the police ask for consent.
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority dismissed the
negative impact its holding will have on domestic abuse.'4 He noted
that the question in this case, whether one occupant's consent to a
search may overcome another's objection, often arises as a result of
domestic abuse.'" According to Chief Justice Roberts, under the
majority's ruling, the police would not be able to assist in the domestic
dispute if the abuser objects. 4 5
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Though he joined Chief Justice Roberts's dissent, Justice Scalia wrote
146
separately to respond to Justice Stevens's critique of originalism.
Justice Scalia criticized Justice Stevens's critique for confusing the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment with the "background
sources of law to which the Amendment, on its original meaning,
referred."1 47 Observing that the Fourth Amendment was originally
tied to common-law trespass, Justice Scalia noted that the issue of who
could consent to a search was not dependent on the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment itself but on changes in property law.1 48 As
Justice Scalia further explained, under the Fourth Amendment, the
reasonableness of a consent-search is contingent on the authority
granted to the consenting occupant by property law. 149 Accordingly,
Justice Scalia concluded that an originalist approach would have no
trouble recognizing that men and women have equal authority over
premises because today's property law acknowledges such equality of the
sexes.'50 Justice Scalia closed his dissent by criticizing Justice Stevens's celebration of the progress of women's equality.'
Noting that
domestic abuse problems most often involve an abusive man and an
abused woman, Justice Scalia remarked that the majority's decision
actually empowers abusive husbands to stop women from allowing police
152
to enter.
In the third and final dissent, Justice Thomas concluded that Coolidge
v. New Hampshire5 ' controlled in this case and asserted that general
searches were not at issue.5 4 According to Justice Thomas, Coolidge
stands for the proposition that when a suspect's spouse voluntarily leads
the police to evidence of the suspect's criminal activities, no unreasonable search occurs.' 55 Accordingly, Justice Thomas asserted that no
unreasonable search occurred here because Mrs. Randolph led the police
to specific evidence of cocaine abuse as opposed to consenting to a
56
general search.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
57

Georgia v.Randolph, with its very fact-specific restriction on the
police's ability to search residences, is somewhat of an anomaly in the
line of third-party consent cases. Prior Supreme Court decisions, such
as Coolidge, Matlock, and Rodriguez, have granted police more flexibility
in searching residences as opposed to constraining those searches.
Consequently, by prohibiting police to conduct a warrantless search of
a home without the consent of both physically present co-occupants,
Georgia is a bit of a deviation from that trend. However, since this
holding seems to render a third-party consent-based search unreasonable
only when the defendant is physically present and objecting, the cases
that will be affected will be relatively few. As a result, in practical
application, this holding may not impact police procedure or attorney
practice in an especially noticeable way.
When police ask to search a home, they will have to obtain the consent
of both occupants if they are both present when an officer asks for
permission to enter. If one of the occupants objects, the police will have
to obtain a warrant unless they have probable cause. It is important to
note, however, that the police will not be able to get around this obstacle
by removing an occupant for the sake of avoiding a possible objection, as
this was specifically prohibited by the Court. 5 ' Though police will
have to comply with the requirements laid out by Randolph, such a
specific situation will probably not occur every day in the life of the
average police officer or with any great deal of frequency.
Criminal defense. attorneys will similarly find few opportunities in
which to cite the holding of this case. Indeed, for Randolph to be of any
use to a defendant on a motion to suppress, the evidence would have to
show that (1) the defendant was present at the time the police asked to
search the house and (2) that the defendant objected despite another
occupant's consent. In that limited circumstance, a defendant would
succeed on his motion to suppress. Again, because these circumstances
are unlikely to appear in all consent-based searches, a criminal defense
attorney will have little occasion to cite this case.
Overall, this case is problematic because instead of providing more
guidance and clarity on the validity of a third-party's consent to a
search, it actually creates more uncertainty for the following two
reasons: (1) the "widely shared social expectations" standard is based on
the social expectations of the co-residents, and (2) the court was split 5-3
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with Justice Alito absent and Justice Breyer hesitantly concurring.
First, this holding is unstable because it is based on social expectations
that are unique to each factual scenario. For example, as mentioned by
Chief Justice Roberts, a visiting aunt would not simply leave a residence
because one occupant invited her in and the other refused to permit
entry. It is not exactly clear that the "widely shared social expectation"
is that the aunt would leave in that situation. Since these social
expectations change so easily in different circumstances, the holding
lends little certainty to police-work or notice to citizens.
Second, Justice Alito was absent, and Justice Breyer only concurred
in this opinion because he based his reasoning on the totality of the
circumstances. If a very similar case came before the Court again, it is
not clear that Justices Alito and Breyer would both follow this line of
reasoning. Consequently, the 5-3 majority in a similar case might
change to 5-4 in favor of a different decision in a later case.
Finally, Randolph leaves several other questions unanswered, as well.
For example, what would happen if there were three occupants, and one
objected while the other two consented? What exactly do "widely shared
social expectations" tell us about that situation? We can infer from the
holding of this case that the objecting occupant will prevail over the two
consenting occupants, but this holding does not specifically address this
issue. The same could be said about several other questions. For
example, does the order in which the police receive the consent and
refusal matter? What if the consent came before the refusal? Moreover,
what do "widely shared social expectations" suggest if the objecting
occupant came in right after the police asked for permission to enter?
These questions remain unanswered by Randolph, and ultimately, they
will have to be answered in another case.
NATHAN A. WOOD

